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Producers have until March 15 to make their crop
insurance decisions. A new product available for some
South Dakota producers is Crop Revenue Insurance;

In the period from Dec. 27, 1996 through Feb. 14,
1997, the USDA released four major reports related to
the livestock industry: (1) Dec. 27 - Hog and Pig report;
(2) Jan. 24 - Cattle on Feed report; (3) Jan. 31 - Cattle
Inventory report; and (4) Feb. 14 - Cattle on Feed
report. The first three reports were bullish, while the
last report was bearish. Some reports, especially the
Hog and Pig report, had a major impact on prices.

This article is used to discuss some of the considerations.

A generally popular insurance product, crop revenue
coverage, will be available to some producers in many
South Dakota cotmties this year. It may be the best
price and yield protection in some cases. In other cases,
multiperil crop insurance (MPCI), hail insurance or
some other insurance product or combination of products
may provide better protection, especially after taking

Some did not.

The first part of this issue of the Commentator will
be devoted to a discussion of the price outlook for the
hog and cattle industries. Included in the discussion will
be a brief review of 1996. The last part of this issue
will include a brief discussion of why USDA reports are
needed by the hog and cattle industries.

costs versus benefits into consideration.
Individual

situations

need

to

be

reviewed

to

determine what is the best protection for you. Your
costs versus your benefits, your marketing behavior,
your financial situation, and your risk attitudes are the
key factors that need to be reviewed.

Hogs

Hog prices in 1996 averaged $53.42 at the five
major terminal markets. That was the third highest
annual average on record (1982 was first at $55.07 and
1990 was second at $54.55). Both November and
December set records for the highest average monthly
prices for those months.

Crop revenue coverage, CRC, offers many of the
same benefits as multiperil crop insurance, such as
subdivision of the"farm into insurance units. In addition,

CRC combines yield -with price to arrive at a revenue
coverage: "CRC ensures that gross revenue from

production (calculated revenue) covers a level of cash
flow called a final revenue guarantee.

In 1996, prices were lowest at the start of the year
(about $40) and highest in late July and early August
(the low $60s). During most of the last 4 to 5 months

Revisedfrom Febraaiy 20,1997 Market Advisorieportby GeorgeFlaskerud,

in 1996, prices were,in the mid $50s.

North Dakota State University.
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$100. The calculated revenue of $100 is $15 less than

the final revenue guarantee of $115.

The final revenue guarantee is the larger of a
minimum revenue guarantee or a harvest guarantee. The
minimum revenue guarantee is derived from a base price
while the harvest guarantee is derived from a harvest
price.

The MPCI

indemnity"would be $12, the same as in Scenario 1.
Scenario III.

Consider a situation the same as in

Scenario I except that actual yield is 10 bushels per acre.
The CRC harvest price remains at $3. Now the CRC

indemnity would be $2 less than the MPCI indemnity.
The following illustration uses wheat as an example
crop. Producers are encouraged to check with their
insiirance sales agents to determine which crops are
available for them to insure under the Crop Revenue
Coverage policies.

Scenario IV.

The base price is 95 percent of the February average
settlement (market close) for the September futures
contract on the Minneapolis Grain Exchange. The
harvest price is 95 percent of the August average
settlement price for the September futures contract on
the MGE. There is a $2 limit to the maximum change,
up or down, between the base and harvest prices. The
95 percent represents a conversion of the futures price to
a local cash price, on average.
How does CRC work?
calculated

revenue

is

less

CRC outperformed MPCI by $6 in Scenario I, by $3

in Scenario n, and by $l5 in Scenario IV; but, MPCI
outperformed CRC by $2 in Scenario III. Whether you
would choose CRC or MPCI depends on how much
more CRC costs than MPCI, your perception of
potential risks, and how aggressive you are in the use of
cash-forward contracts or futures hedges.

CRC allows producers to sell insured growing
inventory at higher prices before harvest than does
MPCI. To illustrate, assume the following: Your
production guarantee at the 65 percent level is 10,000

A loss occurs when the
than the

final

revenue

bushels, you fomard-contract or hedge the 10,000
bushels but "none is produced' and the wheat price goes

guarantee.
Scenario I.

Consider a situation the same as in

Scenario I except that the actual yield is 10 bushels per
acre and the CRC harvest price is $5. Now the CRC
indemnity would be $15 more than the MPCI indemnity.

to $5 at harvest. The 10,000 bushels would need to be
replaced at the harvest price of $5.

Consider a situation where the actual

production history wheat yield is 35 bushels per acre.
The MPCI price for 1997 has been established at $3.85.
Assume that the CRC base price is $3.40 (3.58 x .95),
the CRC harvest price is $3.00 (3.16 x .95) and the
actual 1997 wheat yield on the farm is 20 bushels.

Under MPCI, a total of 7,700 bushels could be

purchased with the mdemnity payment. The indemnity
payment (10,000 x $3.85 = $38,500) divided by $5
equals 7,700 bushels. The difference of 2,300 bushels

In this situation with 65 percent coverage, the CRC
indemnity would be $6 greater than the MPCI
indemnity. The CRC indemnity would be $18 per acre,
derived as follows: The final revenue guarantee is .65 x
35 X$3.40 = $78, where $3.40 is the higher of the base
or harvest prices. The calculated revenue is 20 x $3.00

would have to be purchased with other funds.

Under CRC, the 10,000 bushels could be purchased
with the indemnity payment. The indemnity payment

(10,000 X $5.00 = $50,000) divided by $5 equals
10,000 bushels.

= $60. The calculated revenue of $60 is $18 less than

the final revenue guarantee of $78. In contrast, the
MPCI indemnity would be $12 per acre derived as
follows: The guaranteed yield is 35 x .65 = 23. Since
the actual yield is 20, the yield loss is 3 bushels per
acre. The indemnity payment is 3 x $3.85 = $12.

Can CRC be a useful risk management tool? Yes,
but its usefulness depends on your situation. Be sure to
compare CRC to other risk management tools, all of
which are competing for generally limited operating
capital. Keep in mind, too, that low yields were used in
the examples to illustrate the, insurance concepts-in
effect, to show how to minimize the consequence of an

Scenario H. "Consider a situation the same as in Scenario

I except that the CRC harvest price is $5. Now the
CRC indemnity would be $3 greater than the MPCI
indemnity. The CRC indemnity would be $15 per acre,
derived as follows: The final revenue guarantee is .65 x
35 X$5. = $115, where $5 is the higher of the base or

adverse event should it occur.

livestock... Cont'dfrom p.l)

Higher hog prices in 1996 did not necessarily
translate into profits for producers. High com prices

harvest prices. The calculated revenue is 20 x $5 =
Page 2

and low slaughter hog prices early in the year meant
losses. It also meant very low feeder pig prices. Later,
as prices moved higher, some profitability returned.

1996 helped feedlots eam a profit later in the year.
High com prices were the driving force behind low

Even then, high com prices limited that profitability
throughat least mid-Summer. A large com crop helped
lower com prices enough so that, for most of the last 5
to 6 months of 1996, producers eamed profits.

Because hog production was profitable in late 1996,
many market watchers expected expansion in 1997. The

feeder cattle prices. As a result, cow-calf producers
who retained ownership of their 1995 calf crop lost even
more money. And, cow-calf producers didn't have a
profitable Fall in 1996. Low prices once again caused
losses and some producers went out of business.
Then, the winter of 1996-97 created more problems.
Many cattle were lost. And, more problems are
expected when calves are bom. Calves bom in cold,
damp conditions are subject to scours and pneumonia.
Calves bom to poorly conditioned cows have lower
survival rates. And, cows in poor condition don't
always breed back.

Hog and Pig report not^ earlier did not support that
idea.
In fact, the report pointed toward lower
production, at least early in 1997 (as compared to 1996),
and only modest expansion late in 1997. After the
report was released, the futures market moved higher.
Pork producers had (and still have) very favorable
forward pricing opportunities.

The net result of low prices in 1995 and 1996, the

Winter of .1996-97, and the drought in parts of the
Prices in 1997 should be above $50 most of the

southwestem U.S. is a smaller cow herd. Fewer cows

time. Short-term exceptions, such as in late Feb when

means fewer calves, about 3 percent fewer in 1997.

demand was weak, could occur. Prices also could go
above $60 for short periods of time. If that does occur,
early Summer is the most likely time. Prices late in
1997 could slip below $50. However, even then, prices
should stay in the upper $40s most of the time.
Producers should consider the use of forward pricing.

The seeds for recovery have been sown. The Cattle
Inventory report noted earlier provided data that show
numbers are down in most inventory categories. This is
the first decrease in inventory for 5-6 years. Culling of
cows probably will be at a lower pace in 1997 than in

1996. In some sense, the industry really needs one more
Prices above $50 should mean profits for hog
producers in 1997. Feeder pig producers should be
major beneficiaries of those profits. The profit situation
could change by late in the year. If expansion is greater

year of culling to get numbers down to a more
"profitable" level.

Price for fed cattle in 1997 probably won't be where
producers would like them to be. An average of $65 for
fed cattle probably won't be far off. The two Cattle on
Feed reports noted earlier gave indications that there will

than now expected, prices could be pushed lower than
those noted above. And, we don't yet know what will
happen in the com market.

be plenty of fed cattle, at least through the first half or
If profits for hog producers are maintained for most
of this year and if we have another large com crop, look

two-thirds of the year. Prices could be below $65
(maybe even closer to $60) during the Summer. And,
prices could be closer to $70 late in the year.

for major expansion and lower slaughter hog prices in
1998.

While lower numbers will provide a boost to feeder
cattle prices, a bigger boost could come from the com
market. With a normal crop, feeder cattle prices for 500
pounders could be in the $80-90 area this Fall. With a
very large crop, another $10 could be added to that
range. And, with a very poor Com crop, the range

Cattle

Cattle prices in 1996 were well below breakeven

levels for most producers, especially early in the year.
A combination of plentiful supplies of beef and other
meats kept fed cattle prices low early in the year.
Extremely high costs of production (mainly due to high
com prices) didn't help. By mid-year there was some

could be $10 lower.

USDA Reports

improvement in prices. However, production costs
remained high. Only after a large 1996 com crop and

There often is discussion that USDA reports are not
needed. The discussion ranges everywhere from "they
min the market" to "it's not anyone else's business how
much rproduce". A quick look at a few of the issues

lower com prices did cattle feedlot operators move out
of the red into the black.

Very low prices for feeder cattle in the Spring of

might be in order.
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First, there is a wide disparity in "size" of
producers. Some produce a little, others produce a lot.
Most people in production agriculture in SD fit into the

Third, even if USDA reports causethe market to go
up or down (yes, it can cause "up" moves as well as
"down" moves), pricing opportunities often are created.

medium to small scale size of production. Their only
access to production estimates often is USDA reports.

Aproducer should not really care why prices are offered
at given levels. Rather, they should be ready to "take
those offers" if they are acceptable.

The "big.guys" have their own sources of information.
It seems as if the "little guys" should have their sources,
too.

^

Second, if production agriculture is "really a
business" (it should be viewed that way), then someability to forecast production and prices is needed. If
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only one part of the production side (the big guys) has
that ability, then the small to medium scale producers
are at a disadvantage. Information is a key to a
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successful business.
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